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Money Talks: The First Amendment
Implications of Counterfeiting Law
JULIE K. STAPEL*
"It is often said that 'a picture is worth a thousand words.' Unfortunately, Mr. Boggs'
works are often worth a thousand dollars."'
INTRODUCTION
J.S.G. Boggs, a Pittsburgh artist and Fellow of Art and Ethics at Carnegie Mellon
University, makes money the old-fashioned way: he draws it. Over the past ten years,
Boggs has gained acclaim and notoriety both for his realistic drawings of money and for
his use of the drawings as barter in various transactions.
Boggs' work consists not only of graphic renditions of the currency, but also contains
an element of performance art.2 First, Boggs painstakingly draws pictures of U.S.
currency which vary slightly from the actual bill and have printing on only one side. The
side without printing bears a single green thumbprint? Then Boggs seeks to "spend" his
work by offering his drawings in exchange for everything from motorcycles to art
supplies to stays in luxurious hotels.4 Boggs explains to merchants that his drawings are
not real currency, but rather his artwork which he seeks to trade. The merchants then
decide whether to trade their goods and services for Boggs' art. Lest they think Boggs
does not take the transaction seriously, he always asks for change, "real" money, when
the item purchased costs less than the denomination of the picture he traded.' For those
merchants who accept Boggs' unconventional method of payment (approximately ten
percent of those he approaches agree to the exchange),6 the rewards can be substantial,
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1992, University of Michigan. The
Author would like to thank Professor Daniel 0. Conkle for his helpful editing and for his superb class on the First
Amendment, and David P. Kalat for this Note's topic, his insightful suggestions, and for his constant reminders that there
is more to life than the Bluebook.
1. Boggs v. Bowron, 842 F. Supp. 542, 562 (D.D.C. 1993).
2. Performance art is not an easy concept to explain and dictionary definitions often fall short. Basically, the
performance artist concerns himself with getting the audience more directly involved in the performance. Performance
art is typically very conceptual and usually intended to be performed only once. ROBERT ATKINS, ARTSPEAK 121-22
(Nancy Grubb ed., 1990).
3. Lawrence Wechsler, Money Changes Everything, THE NEw YORKER, Jan. 18, 1993, at 38, 38; The
MacNeil-LehrerNewshour: The Art ofMaking Money (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 22, 1990), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Script File [hereinafter The Art of Making Money]. Boggs has not, however, limited himself to U.S.
currency. Boggs has drawn most European currencies as well, including a Swiss 100 franc note featuring his own portrait.
J.S.G. Boggs,Art UnderArrest, ART&ANnQuEs, Oct. 1987, at 99, 99. In 1987, Boggs was arrested for drawing British
currency and tried for counterfeiting. He was acquitted by a jury in England. Only two years later, an Australian court
found Boggs not guilty of counterfeiting Australian currency. Wechsler, supra, at 38.
4. The Art of Making Money, supra note 3; MONEY MAN (Phillip Haas, Methodact Ltd. 1992) (copy on file with
the Indiana Law Journal).
5. Secret Service Seizes 'Cash'Made by Artist, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1992, at D 12.
6. Roxane Roberts, Fmuny-Money Artist Loses Court Case, Judge Says Secret Service Can Call Prints Counterfeit,
WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1993, at B1, B13.
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as Boggs' work has consistently gained value in the world of art collection.7 Boggs insists
that no one who has accepted his work as barter for goods or services has ever claimed
to have been defrauded or has ever believed they were receiving actual currency!
Boggs' own guarantee that he has defrauded no one has not eased the concerns of the
U.S. Secret Service, who have become very interested in Boggs' work, probably less for
its artistic merit and more because they suspect it is criminal. They allege, that Boggs'
work violates provisions of the U.S. counterfeiting law. The Secret Service first contacted
Boggs in 1991 in Cheyenne, Wyoming after receiving reports that he had exchanged a
drawing for merchandise in a local store. At that time, the U.S. Attorney in Wyoming
decided not to charge Boggs with any offense, but retained the drawings which the Secret
Service had seized. In December, 1992, the Secret Service conducted a search of Boggs'
apartment and office, seizing over one hundred drawings and paintings.9 As of this Note's
completion, no prosecuting authority in the United States had brought charges against
Boggs.
Although no charges were brought, the government did not return Boggs' seized work.
Boggs initiated a civil suit in a Washington, D.C. federal district court seeking the return
of his seized work as well as a declaratory judgment that particular statutory provisions
of the federal counterfeiting law are unconstitutional." The judge held that the Secret
Service may keep the paintings as Boggs is not exempt from criminal liability under the
challenged counterfeiting statutes." Boggs' counsel has appealed the decision,' 2 but in
the meantime Boggs continues to draw. pictures of money, and awaits the next move by
the authorities.
The case of J.S.G. Boggs, while fascinating on its own merits, also illustrates the clash
of the First Amendment and counterfeiting laws. The sections of the counterfeiting laws
at issue here are 18 U.S.C. § 474(a) paragraph 6 and § 504(1) 3 which, taken together,
require that depictions of currency be in black and white and within certain size limits,
regardless of the intent of the person making the depiction. 4 Boggs' case is not the only
example of the clash between First Amendment interests and counterfeiting, particularly
wfien one considers the entire lifespan of these statutes. In fact, conflicts between art and
counterfeit date back to at least 1886 when the Secret Service forbade painter William
7. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 38. The documentary on Boggs, MONEY MAN, supra note 4, contains a scene in which
a restauranteur reluctantly accepts Boggs' drawing in exchange for a meal consumed by Boggs and several friends. Shortly
thereafter, the restaurant owner is approached by an art collector offering to purchase the bill for substantially more than
its face value. The once reluctant restaurant owner declines the offer, deciding instead to hold on to the bill. Id.
8. Eva M. Rodriguez, Federal Judge SendyMoney-MakingArtist to Drawing Board, LEGALTIMES, Dec. 13, 1993,
at 21, 21.
9. Secret Senice Seizes Cash'Made by Artist, supra note 5, at D12.
10. Boggs v. Bowron, 842 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1993). Precisely which statutes Boggs challenged and what those
statutes prohibit are discussed infra part I.
1. Boggs, 842 F. Supp. at 562. For further discussion of the court's analysis in Boggs v. Bowran, see ifra text
accompanying notes 142-47.
12. Boggs has been represented pro bono by the New York office of Washington, D.C.-based Arnold and Porter,
but Boggs plans to "pay" them back in his own bills, thus adding legal services to the list of items purchased with his
work. Roberts, supra note 6, at B13; Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 21.
13. Since the repeated reference to these two sections of the statute is rather unwieldy, this Note will refer to them
as "§ 474 and § 504" even though the entire sections are not under challenge.
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 474(a) para. 6, 504(1)(i)-(iii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
[Vol. 71:153
COUNTERFEITING LA WAND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Michael Hamett from continuing with his paintings of early American paper currency."
Political satirists have run afoul of these statutes, as the 1974 case of Wagner v. Simon 6
illustrates. In this case, the plaintiff had photographed a $20 bill, 7 replaced President
Jackson's portrait with Nixon's, and altered it to look like a $30 bill as a critique of the
Nixon administration." A federal district court rejected the plaintiffs First Amendment
challenge to the statutes which his work was held to have violated."9 Journalists have also
had problems with these statutes. The Supreme Court's only treatment of this issue
involved the cover of an issue of Sports Illustrated magazine which offended the statutes
by featuring a full color photograph of a basketball hoop stuffed with $100 bills.2"
As these examples illustrate, the issue of First Amendment challenges to the
counterfeiting laws transcends Boggs and potentially affects anyone utilizing realistic
depictions of currency with no intent to defraud. The expression prohibited by these
statutes is the type normally protected by the First Amendment. The image of money has
tremendous symbolic value. It is not difficult to imagine how many different political
ideas the image of currency can convey; for example, a critique of economic policies, an
expression of dissatisfaction with the national debt, or a protest against the influence of
lobbyists' contributions on political campaigns could all be expressed with images of
money. For better or for worse, money is a central part of American politics and
American life. As such, its image constitutes a rich symbol in the vocabulary of those
seeking to express thoughts lying at the heart of the First Amendment's protection. The
existence of weighty First Amendment interests dictates that the government interest be
furthered with the least injury to First Amendment concerns. 2'
The government has an indisputably compelling interest in protecting its currency. The
Constitution specifically confers the power "[t]o provide for the Punishment of
counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States."22 The First
Amendment certainly should not protect those who make depictions of money with the
intent to defraud people, no matter how artistic or political the sentiment of the producer.
The free speech rights of those who create depictions of money with no intent to use them
as genuine, however, deserve serious consideration. Sections 474 and 504 violate the
First Amendment by imposing restrictions which depend on the expression's content and
significantly impede artistic and political expression. The statutes do not narrowly or
effectively further the government's interest. Part I of this Note will examine the statutes
prohibiting the realistic depictions of currency. Part II traces the development of the
Supreme Court's content-neutral/content-based distinction in free expression doctrine.
15. BRUCE W. CHAMERS, OLD MONEY: AMERICAN TROMPE L'OEL IMAGES OF CURRENCY 22-23 (1988).
16.412 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1976).
17. Id at 433-34. The court's opinion mistakenly described the currency as a $50 bill instead of a $20 bill. This was
corrected in the Amended Judgment following the opinion. Id at 434.
18. Id. at 428.
19.1d at 433.
20. Regan v. Tine, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,646 (1984). The cover story dealt with a point-shaving scheme on the Boston
College basketball team in which several players were paid to alter the outcome of several games. The Court's opinion
upholding the statutes in Regan v. 77me, Inc. is discussed infra part MTlA.
21. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (emphasizing that freedom of speech and press are
"fundamental personal rights" which require courts to carefully "weigh the circumstances and to appraise the
substantiality" of regulations restricting speech).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
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Part III demonstrates that § 474 and § 504 are invalid content-based restrictions on
expression. Finally, Part IV argues that § 474 and § 504 fail even under more relaxed
content-neutral scrutiny.
I. THE STATUTES
Taken together, paragraph six of § 474(a) and § 504(1) prohibit all depictions of
currency except those in black and white and within certain size limitations. 2 Statutes
similar to § 474 and § 504 have long existed in the United States. However, the modem
version of the statutes differs from its historical counterpart in important ways. Also, §
474 and § 504 must be construed within a larger scheme of anticounterfeiting laws.
A. History of the Statutes
While criminal sanctions for counterfeiting have been around as long as money itself,
24
American laws prohibiting prints, photographs, or impressions of currency without
reference to their use as counterfeit date back to the years surrounding the American Civil
War,' although known cases of counterfeiting occurred well before that time. One of the
earliest known instances of counterfeiting in America occurred in 1647 when a group of
Native Americans passed off counterfeit wampum, a currency composed of beads made
out of shells, on an unwitting colonist. 6 Despite the recorded existence of counterfeiting
about two hundred years before, the precursors of § 474 did not come into existence until
the crisis of the Civil War and the Greenback Era. The introduction of the first paper
currency not directly backed, by gold and the declining prevalence of state banks made
the Civil War era a watershed in the financial structure of the country.' With the entire
financial system in tumult, it is not surprising that counterfeiting would become a major
concern at roughly the same time. The years surrounding the Civil War have been called
the Greenback Era, after the nickname of the paper notes issued to finance the war.
Congress first authorized the issuance of legal tender paper money in 1862 due to the
extreme shortage of precious metals during the war. By the end of the war, the
government had issued $450 million in Greenbacks.29
Issuing Greenbacks not only caused inflation and anxiety about what would happen
when they were redeemed,"0 but Greenbacks also created new opportunities for
counterfeiters. As opposed to bank notes from various states, the Greenbacks were
uniform so that the source of the counterfeiting was much more difficult to discern,
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 474(a) para. 6, 504(1). The size restriction dictates that a depiction must be smaller than
three-fourths or larger than one and one-half the actual size of the bill. lI § 504(1)(I)(ii).
24. See generally LYNN GLASER, COUNTERFEnrING IN AMERICA 1-9 (1968) (calling counterfeiting "the second
oldest profession" and tracing counterfeiting and its punishment back to the invention of coined money in 700 B.C.).
25. Regan v. Tune, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,643 (1984).
26. GLASER, supra note 24, at 11.
27. See IRWIN UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA 3 (1964) ("Mhe Civil War, initiating sweeping financial change, made
the problems of money and banking of extraordinary national concern.).
28. Id at 14-15.
29. Id at 15.
30. Id. at 15-16.
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making counterfeiters harder to catch.3 Salmon P. Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury
at that time, understood the necessity of keeping a tight rein on the number of Greenbacks
issued so as to keep inflation from crippling the country.
32
Counterfeiters presented a particularly grave threat to the nation's economy, given the
well-grounded fear that the issuance of too many Greenbacks would spur serious
inflation,3  and given how crucial the Greenbacks were to the Union's war effort.34 Thus,
when new Greenbacks, which the government had not issued, began appearing, the
Treasury Department decided that, rather than leave anticounterfeiting efforts to state and
local governments, it had to combat counterfeiting itself. In 1864, the federal government
created the Secret Service to do just that.35
By 1864, Congress had enacted a law prohibiting all impressions, prints, and
photographs in the likeness of U. S. currency.36 The broad prohibition was in response
to the dire financial circumstances faced by the nation at that time. The law's effect on
those legitimately using images of currency probably caused no one any great concern.3 7
In fact, historical evidence suggests that the Secret Service had no qualms at all about
enforcing the prohibition against those engaged in artistic expression.3t The 1864
enactment would eventually become § 474, undergoing only a few changes and
amendments since the Civil War era,39 despite the fact that the exigencies of that time
have long ceased to exist. The exceptions to § 474, embodied in § 504, originated in 1923
with no substantial amendment until 1992.41
B. The Modern Statutes
Section 474(a), entitled "Plates or stones for counterfeiting obligations or securities,"
contains six paragraphs each prohibiting a different activity related to producing
depictions or likenesses of currency. The first four paragraphs prohibit the use,
production, sale, or possession of any "plhte, stone or other thing" 4' which can be used
31. GLASER, supra note 24, at 103.
32. Id. at 102.
33. UNGER, supra note 27, at 15-16.
34. GLASER, supra note 24, at 105.
35. Id at 105-07.
36. Act ofane 30, 1864, ch. 172, § 11, 13 Stat. 218, 221-22 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 474 (Supp. V 1993)).
37. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,694-95 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The post-Civil War
Congress that enacted § 474 presumed that anyone printing or photographing likenesses of the curency was up to no good.
The use of images of currency for legitimate communicative purposes was probably too esoteric to be deemed significant
or realistic in the 19th century ... ."). Historical evidence calls into question whether such communicative purposes really
were too esoteric. Artists of the era frequently depicted the Greenback, usually in a tongue-in-cheek manner. See
CHAMBERS, supra note 15, at 20-21. Also, political discourse about money has deep roots in this country: "Since the
seventeenth century, financial questions have often been the distinctive form social conflict has taken in America....
[Dlifferences over currency and the related subject of banking have expressed basic American social and political
antagonisms." UNGER, supra note 27, at 3. Given the artistic movement of frompe Poeil money painters, see infra notes
177-91 and accompanying text, and the highly politicized Greenback Era, perhaps Justice Stevens underestimated the
ability of 19th-century Americans to appreciate the communicative use of images of currency.
38. See generally CHAMBERS, supra note 15 (providing an overview of 19th-century painters who depicted money
and describing the Secret Service investigations of them).
39. Regan, 468 U.S. at 644 n.l.
40.18 U.S.C. § 504.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 474(a) para. 1-4.
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for printing "any obligation or other security of the United States."42 The fifth paragraph
prohibits possession of obligations or other securities "after the similitude of any
obligation or other security issued under the authority of the United States, [made] with
intent to sell or otherwise use the same. 4 3 The sixth paragraph raises the First
Amendment issue. It provides that a person commits a Class C felony if he or she:
prints, photographs or in any other manner makes or executes any engraving,
photograph, print or impression in the likeness of any such obligation or other security,
or any part thereof, or sells any such engraving, photograph, print, or impression, except
to the United States, or brings into the United States, any such engraving, photograph,
print or impression, except by direction of some proper officer of the United States..
44
Read by itself, paragraph six of § 474(a) appears to prohibit all portrayals of currency
without any requirement that the producer jntend to use them as genuine, nor any
requirement that the engraving, photograph, print, or impression run the risk of
fraudulent use by someone else.
It is imperative to read § 474 in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 504, which narrows the
apparently broad prohibition of § 474. Section 504 begins with a general statement that
the printing and publishing of illustrations of obligations and other securities is
permitted, 45 seemingly contradicting paragraph six of § 474(a). However, two crucial
limitations follow immediately thereafter: first, the illustrations must be in black and
white; second, the illustrations must be less than three-fourths or greater than one and
one-half the size of the actual object being illustrated.46 Like § 474, § 504 contains no
intent requirement.
Section 504 contains two provisions which grant the Department of the Treasury
authority to write regulations that carve out exceptions to the prohibitions outlined in §
504. Section 504(1) allows the Secretary of the Treasury to determine appropriate
occasions to permit color illustrations of currency. 47 Section 504(2) gives the Department
of the Treasury the same power to grant exceptions to the ban on reproducing illustrations
of currency through electronic means.
41
This grant of authority raises the question of whether administrators have been given
too much discretion to limit expression. The Supreme Court has held that government
administrators may not have too much discretion in administering laws which restrict
42. Id. § 474(a) para. I. "[Oibligation and other security" is defined to include the following:
bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national bank currency, Federal Reserve notes, Federal Reserve bank
notes, coupons, United States notes, Treasury notes, gold certificates, silver certificates, fractional notes,
certificates of deposit, bills, checks, or drafts for money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of the
United States, stamps and other representatives of value ....
Id. § 8 (1988). Given the expansive definition of"obligations or other securities," the remainder of this Note will refer to
them collectively as "currency," acknowledging that the definition includes all of these other items as well.
43. Id. § 474(a) para. 5.
44. Id. § 474(a) para. 6.
45. Id. § 504(1).
46. Id. § 504(l)(i)-(ii). The remainder of this Note will refer to these two provisions of § 504 as the "color and size
restrictions."
47. Id. § 504(l)(D)(iii).
48. Id. § 504(2) (providing that the Secretary of the Treasury establish regulations to permit "legitimate use of such
electronic methods" so that "businesses, hobbyists, press or others shall not be unduly restricted" (emphasis added)).
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expression. There must be specific standards or criteria for how the law should be
administered.49 The language in § 504(1) seems particularly susceptible to abuse since it
is so general: "The Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations to permit color
illustrations of such currency of the United States as the Secretary determines may be
appropriate for such purposes."5 The potential for uncabined administrativediscretion
adds a further potential constitutional infirmity to these statutes.
In June, 1995, the Secret Service, a subdivision of the Treasury Department, issued
proposed rules dealing with color illustrations of United States currency under the
authority granted to it in § 504. The proposed rules allow color illustrations of currency,
within the size limits specified in § 504, if the following condition is met: "The term
'non-negotiable' must be placed on any illustration in clearly legible, bold, black, block
letters, being a minimum of one quarter inch high, and prominently and conspicuously
placed across the center portion of any illustration, covering at least one third of the
linear length of the illustration."'" While this proposed rule represents an improvement
from a complete ban on color depictions, it still presents significant First Amendment
problems.5
2
Despite- carrying criminal penalties, neither § 474 nor § 504 contains an intent
requirement. The concept that a crime requires scienter, or mens rea, is an idea "deeply
entrenched" in American criminal law.53 The Supreme Court strongly expressed that
notion in the 1952 case of Morisette v. United States. 4 The Court reversed Morisette's
conviction for converting government property because it found that the defendant
reasonably believed that the government had abandoned the material, although in fact it
had not.55 Justice Jackson wrote:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is
no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of
law as belief in the freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil."
Justice Jackson also discussed intent elements in statutes, arguing that although Congress
had not written an intent requirement into the statute under which Morisette was
convicted, an intent requirement for this type of offense is inherent when not explicitly
provided.57
Numerous defendants charged with violations of § 474 have argued that an intent
requirement should be imputed to § 474. Federal courts, however, have consistently
49. See, e.g., Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750,754 (1988) (striking down a local ordinance
which required a permit for the placement of newspaper racks on public property where one of the possible reasons to deny
a permit was "other terms and conditions deemed necessary and reasonable by the Mayor"); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444,451-52 (1938) (reversing conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for distributing religious literature in public without a
permit because the city ordinance authorizing the city manager to issue permits contained no specific criteria).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 504(1)(D)(iii).
51.60 Fed. Reg. 32,929-30 (1995) (to be codified at 31 C.F.IL pt. 411) (proposed June 26, 1995).
52. See infra part III.B.
53. JOSHUA DRESSIER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.01 (1987).
54. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
55. Id. at 247-48.
56. Id. at 250 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 261-62.
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rejected such claims."' Each of the cases dealing with § 474's intent requirement have
upheld the 1954 case of Webb v. United States, which held that Congress intended by
enacting § 474 to allow no impressions of the currency whatsoever, regardless of their
purpose. The court in Webb held:
[T]he mere making of an impression in the likeness of an obligation or security issued
by the United States is a violation of the statute without proof of unlawful intent ...
Consequently, in such a case, there being no need of proof of unlawful intent, there is
no need of proof that such impressions were calculated to deceive.59
While the Supreme Court has never specifically decided the issue of § 474's intent
requirements, the lower federal courts have been consistent in following the strict
liability holding of Webb. The absence of an intent requirement, apart from any inquiry
into whether § 474 and § 504 are content-based, presents a First Amendment problem of
its own. A strict liability statute likely would chill artistic or political depictions of
currency never intended for use as counterfeit. 0
C. The Counterfeiting Statutes in General
Sections 474 and 504 exist in the context of other laws criminalizing counterfeiting
activity. Section 471 prohibits making, forging, counterfeiting, or altering any obligation
or other security with the intent to defraud." Section 471 appears to overlap significantly
with paragraph six of § 474(a) which also prohibits making any depiction in the likeness
of currency but lacks the element of intent to defraud. 2 Section 473 prohibits buying,
selling, exchanging, transferring, receiving, or delivering the counterfeit obligations
"with the intent that the same be passed, published, or used as true and genuine."'63 Other
provisions of the counterfeiting law prohibit possessing, making, and using counterfeits
of foreign currencies with an intent to defraud."
One other section of the counterfeiting laws merits brief First Amendment discussion.
Section 475 prohibits use of the image of currency for any business or advertising
purpose.6 Business and commercial use of currency's image shares some common issues
58. United States v. Kenny, 5 F.3d 214,217 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Green, 962 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir.
1992); Webb v. United States, 216 F.2d 151,152 (6th Cir. 1954); Wholesale Vendors of Texas, Inc. v. United States, 361
F. Supp. 1045, 1047-48 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
59. Webb, 216 F.2d at 152.
60. Indeed, there is some indication that this is more than a theoretical possibility. J.S.G. Boggs contends that the
possibility of prosecution or other Secret Service activity has kept the artist's cooperative to which he belongs from
accepting his work and has repelled potential buyers. Boggs v. Bowron, 842 F. Supp. 542, 548 (D.D.C. 1993).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 471 (1988).
62. Id § 474(a) para. 6.
63. Id § 473 (1988).
64. Id §§ 478-483 (1988).
65. The statute provides that whoever commits the following acts commits a felony:
Whoever designs, engraves, prints, makes, or executes, or utters, issues, distributes, circulates, or uses
any business or professional card, notice, placard, circular, handbill, or advertisement in the likeness or
similitude of any obligation or security of the United States ... or writes, prints, or otherwise impresses
upon or attaches to any such instruments, obligation or security, or any coin of the United States, any
business or professional card, notice, or advertisement, or any notice, or advertisement, or any notice or
advertisement whatever.
Id § 475 (1988). As with § 474 and § 504, § 475 contains no intent requirement, probably because in this context the clear
intent would be to advertise and thus not to pass as counterfeit.
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with the cases involving commercial use of the flag66 and the promotional use of the
Olympic symbols.67 Neither of these cases, however, resolve all of the First Amendment
issues presented by § 475.61 A ban on depictions of money for business and commercial
purposes deprives the commercial speaker of a universal and powerful symbol;
consequently, the government should ensure that its regulation of such speech is as
narrow as possible. Although a constitutional challenge to § 475 has never been reported,
the First Amendment advocate has credible arguments to make.6 9
II. CONTENT STATUS DOCTRINE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The distinction between content-neutral and content-based regulations of speech has
been called "[p]erhaps the most intriguing feature of contemporary first amendment
doctrine."7 This distinction carries major consequences for the type of constitutional
scrutiny applied to a restriction by a reviewing court."' In order to understand § 474 and
§ 504's content status and, accordingly, the scrutiny to be applied, an analysis of the
Supreme Court's content status doctrine is necessary.
The wellspring of the Supreme Court's First Amendment content analysis is United
States v. 0 'Brien.72 O'Brien was convicted for violating the Universal Military Training
and Service Act when he burned his draft card on the steps of a Boston courthouse." In
O'Brien, the Court laid out its four-part test for determining whether restrictions on
so-called "symbolic speech" are constitutional. 74 A governmental regulation is
permissible:
66. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907) (upholding a state prohibition against using representations of the United
States flag for advertising merchandise).
67. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm'n, 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding that the
United States Olympic Committee had been granted exclusive use of the word 'Olympic").
68. The Supreme Court's flag burning decisions in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the state's
interest in preserving the flag as a national symbol does not justify defendant's criminal conviction for burning the
American flag), and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (holding that prosecution for burning a flag in
violation of the Flag Protection Act is inconsistent with the First Amendment), substantially weaken the holding in Halter
which relied heavily on the legitimacy of the government's interest in protecting the sanctity of the flag against commercial
degradation. Halter, 205 U.S. at 43. If the Supreme Court has rejected legislation purporting to protect against the
degradation of the flag the Court likely would also reject any argument that § 475 serves to protect against the degradation
of the image of the currency.
San Francisco Arts & Adeties is distinguishable, also. In that case, the use of the Olympic symbols by an organization
(unrelated to the actual Olympics) sponsoring a gay olympics implicated trademark concerns since the Olympic symbols
resemble a trademark of the United States Olympic Commission. It is much harder to argue that the dollar is some sort
of trademark of the United States.
69. The greatest obstacle for the First Amendment advocate would be the Supreme Court's holding that commercial
speech does not merit fidl-fledged First Amendment protection. See Central Hudson Gas & Elee. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
70. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 189 (1983).
71.See LAuRENcE H. TRIBE, AMECAN CoNs O nONAL LAW § 12-2, at 791-92 (2d ed. 1988); see also John Hart
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484 (1975) (describing the critical "switching function" served by the inquiry into whether the
government interest is related to the suppression of fiee expression).
72.391 U.S. 367 (1968).
73. Id at 369-70.
74. The analysis presented in O'Brien applies to more than just symbolic speech cases, although that is how the Court
classified the expression in O'Brien. Ely, supra note 71, at 1484.
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if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 5
This four-part test has become known as the second track of the O'Brien analysis, and it
is applied to regulations considered content-neutral. Content-based regulations command
a more demanding analytical approach often called categorization.76
A. Classifying as Content-Based or
Content-Neutral
Frequently, a statute or regulation does not fit easily within either the content-neutral
category nor the content-based category,' but some general guidelines shed light on this
classification. When the government regulation is designed to avert harm flowing from
the message, such a regulation is content-based." A content-based regulation targets a
harm unique to the communicative aspect of an activity, not harm resulting from an
activity regardless of its message. Content-neutral regulations, on the other hand, aim at
the noncommunicative impact of the expressive activity. 79 The harm flows not from the
message, but from the act of communicating itself."o
Some laws might be facially content-neutral, but are applied based on communicative
impact. The problem of facial neutrality but nonneutral application arose in two recent
Supreme Court cases which reached two differentresults. In United States v. Eiehman,5 '
the Court struck down the federal Flag Protection Act passed by Congress in response to
an earlier ruling of the Court holding laws against flag burning unconstitutional."2 The
government argued that the Flag Protection Act was content-neutral and distinguishable
from the content-based law previously struck down. The difference, said the government,
was that the new law prohibited flag-burning not because of the message nor because of
the audience's likely response, but rather it prohibited flag-burning to protect the
physical integrity of the flag so that it may remain a unified national symbol.s The Court
rejected this distinction: "Although the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit
content-based limitation on the scope of the prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear
that the Government's asserted interest is . ..concerned with the content of such
75. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
76. Ely, supra note 71, at 1484.
77. This Note will refer to the content-basedlcontent-neutral distinction as the regulation's "content status" for the
remainder of the Note.
78. Ely, supra note 71, at 1497.
79. TRIBE, supra note 71, § 12-2, at 790; Stone, supra note 70, at 208.
80. In his treatise, Professor Tribe uses the following hypothetical ordinances to compare and contrast content-based
and content-neutral laws: "A misdemeanor to affix on a government building any sign expressing opposition to former
governors of Georgia," and "[a] misdemeanor to affix on a government building any object not readily removable." TRIBE,
supra note 71, § 12-3, at 797-98. The former illustrates a content-based ordinance and the latter a content-neutral
ordinance.
81. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
82. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
83. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315.
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expression."' 4 Whether a communicative act involving the flag interferes with the flag's
role as a unified national symbol has much to do with what message the act conveys.85
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre,6 a nightclub owner and nude dancers sought to strike down
Indiana's public nudity statute, arguing that although content-neutral on its face, it was
actually applied based on content. Specifically, they argued that the law targeted the
message of eroticism conveyed by nude barroom dancing. 7 The Court rejected this
argument and identified the very fact of nudity as the harm, not any message of
eroticism."8 But if the fact of being nude is the harm to be averted, then all nude
performances would be equally harmful, not just nude dancing in bars,8 9 The comparison
of the Eichman and Barnes cases demonstrates that the content status determination can
be quite slippery and malleable, despite its primary importance in deciding the fate of the
regulation.
B. Content-Neutral Regulations
1. Existence of a First Amendment Interest
With content-neutral regulations, courts must first confirm that a First Amendment
interest exists, and then apply a case-by-case balancing test. The Court in O'Brien
recognized the possibility that some conduct, although perhaps intended to express an
idea, may not in fact invoke a First Amendment interest."0 The Court grappled with this
issue again in Spence v. Washington,9 in which it developed a test for determining when
conduct should be considered expression. If conduct is to be considered expression, not
only must the speaker intend to communicate an idea through his or her conduct, but the
action must also be understood by observers to be expression."
84. Id (emphasis in original).
85. Id at 316.
86. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
87. Id. at 570.
88. Id at 571. The Court's reasoning in Barnes bears some resemblance to the reasoning rejected by the Court in
Eichman. The government in Eiclian argued that the fact that it was the flag being burned was the harm, making the law
content-neutral.
89. Ironically, the state in Barnes conceded that the public nudity law would probably not be applied to other nude
performances such as plays, operas, or ballets. This significantly undercuts the idea that the fact of being nude is the evil
to be averted. Id at 590 (White, J., dissenting).
90. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
91.418 U.S. 405 (1974).
92. Id. at 409-10. The Court here acknowledges that the context of the speaker's action goes a long way towards
observers underatariding the action as communicative; that is, the display of a flag adomed with a taped-on peace symbol
in the midst of the Cambodian invasion and the events at Kent State was meaningful to observers in a way that it might
not be meaningful if displayed today. Id at 410 (describing the facts of Spence). However, it is not clear from the Spence
opinion how precisely the observer must understand the message's content. It does not specify whether simply recognizing
that an act is communicating an idea, any idea, is enough. It seems plausible that if someone displayed a flag with a peace
symbol taped on it today it would still be recognized as communicating an idea, even if the specifies of the idea are not
as readily perceived as they would have been in 1970. Furthermore, it would not be fair to extend First Amendment
protection only to those speakers communicating a message simple enough to be understood by an average observer.
'ovel or intricate messages are at least initially apt not to be fully understood. One need only think of modem art to
realize that we often consider something expressive without knowing what its exact message is" Laurie Magid, Note, First
Amendment ProtectionforAmbiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 467,486 (1984). Thus, the Spence test would be more
speech protective if it required an observer only to perceive that the speaker is communicating some idea, even if the
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The issue of whether conduct is also expression has arisen in other contexts as well. In
the case of Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, demonstrators against
homelessness challenged a National Park Service rule which prevented the demonstrators
from sleeping during their protest on the National Mall.93 The Court skirted the issue of
whether the sleeping constituted expression by accepting, without deciding, the lower
court's conclusion that such sleeping was indeed expressive activity.94 The Court should
not have skirted the issue because this case nicely presents the expressive/nonexpressive
dilemma." This case presents a close call primarily because sleeping has a prevalent
noncommunicative purpose (i.e., to get rest). Also, the demonstrators may have been
sleeping in the park merely for convenience and not to communicate anything. As a
result, both prongs of the Spence test may prove problematic since the demonstrators may
not have intended to communicate at all. Even if they did intend to communicate,
sleeping at the demonstration site might reasonably be construed by observers as getting
rest there instead of elsewhere.96 On the other hand, sleeping outdoors makes a great deal
of symbolic sense as a means of protesting homelessness. The closeness of the symbolic
"fit" between sleeping outdoors and demonstrating against homelessness makes it more
likely that observers would understand it as communication. The Clark case illustrates
the potential difficulty with even this threshold issue.
2. The Ad Hoc Balancing Test
Having established that a First Amendment interest exists, courts apply an ad hoc
balancing test which weighs the competing governmental and First Amendment interests.
One side of the metaphorical scale weighs the government's interest, and then adjusts it
by how efficiently the challenged regulation advances that interest.97 The other side of
the scales weighs the First Amendment interest, and adjusts it by the degree to which the
regulation impedes that interest. 9" The greater the abridgment of the First Amendment
interest, the more rigorously the government must prove its interest's substantiality and
the regulation's advancement of it."
Dramatically different levels of scrutiny coexist under the rubric of the content-neutral
balancing test, making the First Amendment test quite subjective.ee Perhaps the best
observer may not understand or be able to verbalize it.
93.468 U.S. 288 (1984).
94. Id at 293. The decision was not easy for the lower court. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, sitting en bane, held the sleeping to be communicative activity by only the slimmest majority. Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 592-94 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), rev'd, 468 U.S. 288 (1983).
95. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 301-02 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argues not
that the court of appeals decided improperly that the activity was expressive, but rather that the Supreme Court should have
examined the issue for itself because merely to assume the activity at issue constitutes expression "denatures [the
demonstrators'] asserted right and thus makes all too easy identification of a Government interest sufficient to warrant its
abridgment." Id. at 302.
96. See Magid, supra note 92, at 484.
97. Courts "considero] . .. 'the substantiality of the government interests' served by the restriction, and 'whether
those interests could be served by means that would be less intrusive on activity protected by the First Amendment.'"
Stone, supra note 70, at 190 (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 70 (1981)).
98. TRIBE, supra note 71, § 12-23, at 979.
99. Stone, supra note 70, at 190.
100. Id
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example of how deferential content-neutral scrutiny can be is Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, discussed in the preceding section. The majority opinion not only
accepted as substantial the Park Service's interest in limiting wear and tear on park land,
it also accepted the more tenuous proposition that the ban on sleeping effectively
advanced this interest.'' The Park Service had already granted the demonstrators
permission to hold an around-the-clock demonstration and to erect tents to create
"symbolic tent cities." 02 Evidently, it was permissible to sit, lie down, and even feign
sleeping inside these tents as part of the demonstration. Because sleeping would damage
park property no more than the actions already permitted by the Park Service, its
regulation was poorly tailored to serving its stated interest. 3 The Court simply did not
address this apparent inconsistency, but instead deferred to the park officials:
We do not believe... that either United States v. O'Brien or the time, place, or manner
decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as the manager
of the Nation's parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge how much
protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained.'
Deferring completely to the Park Service's judgment that prohibiting the physical act of
sleeping makes a meaningful contribution to preserving park property reveals how weak
content-neutral scrutiny can be.Ios
Not all cases get such deferential scrutiny. In Schneider v. State,"06 the Court struck
down various municipal ordinances which sought to ban distribution of literature in
streets and other public places. 0 7 Instead of deferring to government officials, the Court
applied the balancing test forcefully. The Court recognized and accounted for the serious
abridgment which the time-honored practice of leafletting would suffer under these
ordinances, stating:
We are of the opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance
is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public
street from handing literature to one willing to receive it. Any burden imposed upon the
city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such
distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and
press.' 0'
The Schneider case illustrates the rigorous end of the balancing spectrum, and provides
a reminder that content-neutral analysis need not automatically be toothless merely
because the regulation is content-neutral.
101.468 U.S. 288,299 (1984).
102. Id. at 291-92.
103. Id. at 312 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Id at 299.
105. Id at 308 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Schneider obviously pre-dates O'Brien, but the test applied to time, place, and manner
restrictions is basically the same as that which would become known as the second track of 0'Brien.
107. Id at 160.
108. Id at 162.
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C. The Content-Based Track
Courts apply an entirely different type of scrutiny to those regulations deemed to be
content-based. For a content-based regulation to survive, the speech it regulates must fit
into an unprotected category. 'I The categorization approach does not forgo balancing
altogether, but rather the balancing is performed at such a level of abstraction that the
facts of any particular case cannot sway the evaluation.
Tinker v. Des Moines School District"0 and Cohen v. California", represent fairly
typical cases of content-based analysis. In Tinker, several schoolchildren were expelled
from school for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. The Court found
that the student's conduct fit into none of the unprotected speech categories;, 2 thus, the
Court invalidated the regulation without any balancing of the competing interests in that
case.I" In Cohen, the defendant was prosecuted under a breach of the peace statute for
wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" while in a courthouse. The Court
found that this conduct belonged to no unprotected category of speech, and declined to
create a new category for offensive language." 4 The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction without balancing the particular interests involved. Comparing Tinker and
Cohen to cases on the content-neutral track, it becomes clear that courts are much less
deferential or willing to speculate about the government's interest in cases with
content-based laws.
III. THE CONTENT STATUS OF § 474 AND § 504
The basic outline of the Supreme Court's content status doctrine offers some guidance
in classifying § 474 and § 504, the task to which this Note now turns.
A. Cases Addressing the Content Status of
§ 474 and § 504
In 1974, a federal district court faced the clash of political expression and § 474 in
Wagner v. Simon.I" Described briefly in the Introduction to this Note,"6 the plaintiff, an
art student, sought a declaratory judgment that § 474 was unconstitutional." 7 The
plaintiff photographed a $20 bill and altered it to look like a $30 bill with President
109. TRIBE, supra note 71, § 12-2, at 791-92; Ely, supra note 71, at 1484.
110. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
111. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
112. The unprotected categories include incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); defamation with
actual malice, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
and fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
113. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. The Court did recognize that school officials have some extra latitude in restricting
student speech in the interest of order in the school, but even this latitude does not upset the strong preference for
protecting speech. Id.
114. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24, 26.
115.412 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1976).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
117. Wagner, 412 F. Supp. at 428.
[Vol. 71:153
COUNTERFEITING LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Nixon's portrait replacing that of President Jackson."' The plaintiffs constitutional
arguments were that § 474 is overbroad and, alternatively, that § 474 is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to him." 9 The court rejected both of these arguments. While not
explicitly analyzing the content status of § 474, the court applied the content-neutral
analysis, concluding that § 474 "is an appropriately narrow means of protecting a
substantial government interest."'' 0 While the brief trial court opinion did not provide
much doctrinal analysis, Wagner v. Simon did form a framework for further analysis by
federal courts.
The Supreme Court's one and only pronouncement on the constitutionality of § 474
and § 504 is the 1984 case of Regan v. Time, Inc.' The front cover of the February 16,
1981, issue of Sports Illustrated magazine sparked the controversy leading to this case.
The cover featured a color photograph of $100 bills pouring into a basketball hoop.'
The cover story recounted of a point-shaving scheme involving members of the Boston
College basketball team. The Secret Service, which had informed Time, Inc. on several
occasions that its photographs violated these statutes, told Time, Inc.'s legal department
that it would seize all the material used in producing the February 16, 1981, cover. Time,
Inc. then initiated this action seeking a declaratory judgment that § 474 and § 504 were
unconstitutional. ";
Before the 1992 amendments, § 504 contained much more specific language about how
the permitted illustrations could be used. The statute allowed illustrations of currency for
"philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes in articles,
books, journals, newspapers or albums.' 24 These two restrictions on depictions of
currency were called the "purpose" and "publication" requirements. In addition to the
purpose and publication requirements, the color and size restrictions applied." Because
the decision in Regan was governed by the pre-1992 version of § 504, a portion of the
Court's analysis in this case is unique to the old version of the statute. Much of the
analysis, however, remains relevant to the statutes as they currently stand.
The Court's opinions in Regan are badly splintered with a majority opinion on only
one issue and various pluralities on others. A majority of five Justices held § 504's
purpose requirement unconstitutional. 26 The Court found the purpose requirement to be
a content-based restriction on speech since "the newsworthiness or educational value of
a photograph cannot help but be based on the content of the photograph and the message
it delivers."' 27 Applying the content-based track of scrutiny, the majority, without any
explicit balancing, concluded that the purpose requirement was unconstitutional.' 2' A
118. Id
119. Id at 431.
120. Id at 432.
121.468 U.S. 641 (1984).
122. Regan, 468 U.S. at 646.
123.Id
124. 18 U.S.C. § 504(1) (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 504(1) (Supp. V 1993)).
125. Id
126. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackman, and Powell joined the holding.
127. Regan, 468 U.S. at 648.
128. Id at 649.
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plurality' held that, although § 504's purpose requirement was unconstitutional, it was
severable and thus the section as a whole could stand. 3 ' Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined in finding the purpose requirement unconstitutional, but argued that the entire
section must fall since the purpose requirement was necessary to the statutory scheme.' 3'
Justice Stevens, acting as the swing vote, wrote a separate opinion rejecting the reasoning
of both sides and arguing that the statutes could have been interpreted to avoid the
constitutional issue.1
3 2
The second major issue 3 3 the Court confronted in Regan was the validity of § 504's
color and size restrictions. Basically, the allegiances remained the same. In Justice
White's plurality opinion, he distinguished the color and size restrictions from the
purpose requirement by classifying the color and size restrictions as content-neutral.
34
The plurality applied the content-neutral track quite leniently, with scrutiny more similar
to Clark than to Schneider,135 and held that the increased deterrence of counterfeiting
outweighs any expressive interest involved in realistic depictions of currency. 36 In his
separate opinion, Justice Stevens also upheld the color and size restrictions. He argued
that little expressive value is gained by lifting the color and size restrictions, whereas
keeping them in place gives the government "one weapon in an arsenal designed to
deprive would-be counterfeiters and defrauders of the tools of deception."'3 7
Since Justices Brennan and Marshall believed that the unconstitutional purpose
requirement invalidated the entire section, they purported not to make any judgment on
the constitutionality of the color and size restrictions. But Brennan critiqued the
plurality's reasoning on this issue, although ostensibly not deciding it.1' t First, Justice
Brennan argued that the reason proffered by the government, and accepted by Justice
White, as the justification for the color restriction was not the true reason behind it.
White seemed to rely on a statement made by a Treasury Department official that the
large number of negatives required to make a color photograph makes it too easy for
counterfeiters to obtain one of the negatives. 39 Justice Brennan, on the other hand,
129. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor constituted the plurality.
130. Regan, 468 U.S. at 653.
131. Id. at 664-68 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
132. Id. at 697-704 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
133. The Court also dealt with Time, Inc.'s claims of vagueness and overbreadth with regard to the publication
requirement. The plurality, and Justice Stevens in a separate opinion, rejected both claims. The vagueness claim failed
because it was merely an academic question for Time, Inc., whose magazines all clearly fall within the publications
requirement. Regan, 468 U.S. at 649-50. The overbreadth claim failed because the requirement of substantial overbreadth
was not satisfied. Id. at 650-52. Such a brief discussion of these issues is not intended to indicate that they were
unimportant to the Court's analysis, but that for purposes of this Note the content-related analysis is more relevant.
134. Id. at 655-56.
135. See stpra text accompanying notes 100-08.
136. Regan, 468 U.S. at 657.
137. Id. at 704 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). As will be discussed later, the application of§ 474 and § 504
is not limited to would-be counterfeiters since the statutes contain no intent requirement and the previous courts have held
that no intent requirement should be inferred. So in addition to would-be counterfeiters (who would also be subject to
prosecution under § 471), this particular weapon in the arsenal is also used against those desiring to use the image of
currency with no intent to counterfeit at all.
138. Id. at 688 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
139. Id. at 657 (plurality opinion). Color film is developed from a multi-layered negative, with each layer supplying
one ofthe necessary colors. Thus, each color photograph produces at least three times as many negatives as a black-and-
white photograph. INTERNATIONAL CTR. OF PHOTOGRAPHY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHOTOGRAPHY 112-13 (1984).
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contended that the concern about color negatives was an after-the-fact justification for
the government's desire to stop all accurate depictions of currency. 4 ' Second, even if one
accepted the government's justification, Brennan still faulted the government for not
narrowly tailoring its regulation. Counterfeiters could find better, easier ways to produce
their wares without the complicated process of using color negatives.' 41 Brennan's
criticism of the Court's reasoning on this issue highlights the problems with the
narrowness and effectiveness of § 504.
The splintered remains of the opinions in Regan v. Time, Inc. leave essentially this: (1)
a no longer existing provision of § 504 struck down as unconstitutional, but the statute
saved; (2) five Justices (two of whom, Burger and White, no longer serve on the Court)
holding that the color and size restrictions are constitutionally permissible under
O 'Brien's second track; (3) two Justices (Powell and Blackmun, who have since retired)
failing to address the color and size issue at all; and (4) two more Justices (Brennan and
Marshall, who are also no longer on the Court) ostensibly not deciding the color and size
issue, but leveling substantial criticism at the plurality's reasoning. Due to the disjointed
reasoning in Regan v. Time, Inc. and the change in the Court's composition since that
time, the Court could plausibly reconsider its treatment of this issue.
The issue of these statutes' constitutionality surfaced in federal court again in 1993
when J.S.G. Boggs brought his suit for declaratory relief and for the return of his work
seized by the Secret Service. 42 The district court, after establishing that Boggs' activity
implicates First Amendment concerns, 4 1 turned to the issue of whether § 474 and § 504
are content-neutral or content-based. The district court, following the Supreme Court's
lead in Regan v. Time, Inc., held that the color and size restrictions of § 504 are
content-neutral. The Court reasoned: "Mr. Boggs' work may be somewhat affected when
it does not appear to be actual currency. However, this limitation is not based on content
or the message it delivers. It is a mechanical restriction, requiring no inquiry or
evaluation into 'the nature of the message being imparted." 1 44 The court also rejected
Boggs' argument that the government showed no real nexus between the statute and the
government's professed interest, particularly since paragraph six of § 474 contains no
intent requirement. Boggs argued that the government could use other sections of the
counterfeiting laws, such as those targeting people actually intending to counterfeit, to
further its interest.14 Ultimately, the court concluded that while Boggs' work effectively
presents valid commentary about the value of money and trust in political institutions,
§ 474 and § 504 are constitutionally permissible tools for the government to use to
combat counterfeiting. 146 The district judge denied Boggs' request for declaratory
140. Regan, 468 U.S. at 688 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
141.I d
142. Boggs v. Bowron, 842 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1993). The facts of this case and the story of Boggs himself were
already discussed, supra text accompanying notes 1-14, but the district court's legal analysis becomes relevant in this
section.
143. Boggs, 842 F. Supp. at 551.
144. Id at 555 n.31 (quoting Regan, 468 U.S. at 656).
145. Boggs, 842 F. Supp. at 556.
146. Id. at 562.
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judgment and allowed the Secret Service to retain Boggs' paintings. 47 Boggs has
appealed this decision, so there might be a new federal court ruling in the near future.
B. Sections 474 and 504 as Content-Based
Regulations of Speech
Despite courts' consistent position that these statutes are content-neutral, a closer look
at the statutes' purpose and function supports the conclusion that they are actually
content-based. Sections 474 and 504 only prohibit expression containing the image of
currency. The harm which the statutes seek to avert flows from the content, not from any
noncommunicative aspects of the expression. Violating § 474 and § 504 literally depends
on content: only realistic pictures of money are prohibited.
A depiction, for instance, of the Presidential seal in full color and actual size would be
of no concern under these statutes. Assuming no copyright violations, artists may legally
depict a variety of government symbols in painstakingly realistic detail. Only realistic
depictions of money run afoul of the law.
Imagine, for example, how differently Boggs would be treated if he painted something
other than money. If he painted landscapes or portraits that he bartered for goods and
services, the Secret Service would quickly lose interest. However, because his pictures
depict money, they are the subject of regulation and the concern of the Secret Service.
The content of Boggs' expression, not the time, place, or manner of his expression,
attracts the Secret Service's attention.
These examples illustrate that the government's purpose in enacting the statutes is not
to prevent improper use of government symbols nor to prevent bartering art work. The
regulations seek to avert some harm arising from the fact that the expression contains
realistic images of currency, making them content-based regulations. 4 '
Furthermore, the policy reasons underlying First Amendment doctrine argue for these
regulations being classified as content-based. By restricting depictions of currency, the
government favors one idea over another: The government says that political, social,
economic, or artistic commentary expressed with realistic depictions of currency is not
acceptable, but other commentary is. By restricting access to such a powerful image as
money, the government substantially restricts the ability of a speaker to convey the ideas
she or he wishes to express. Restricting access to certain ideas hinders the free flow of
information in the "marketplace of ideas," and thus also hinders listeners' ability to make
informed decisions about the ideas being censored. 49
Simply favoring one method of expression over another, however, does not
automatically qualify the regulation as content-based. For example, there might be ideas
best expressed by spray paint on the wall of the Lincoln Memorial or by a loudspeaker
in the middle of the night in a residential neighborhood. Considering the competing
147. Id. at 562-63.
148. Ely, supra note 71, at 1497-98.
149. For a general overview of various theories of the First Amendment, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTTrrTiONAL LAW § 16.6 (4th ed. 1991).
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interests at stake in these hypotheticals, the government could rightly disfavor ideas
expressed in these ways vis-A-vis ideas not expressed in these ways.
Realistic depictions of currency, however, differ significantly from the Lincoln
Memorial and loudspeaker hypotheticals. Realistic depictions of currency have a
particular content in and of themselves, and they express an idea when used
communicatively. A particular mode of expression, even if important to the overall
message being expressed, does not have its own content or express its own idea. Currency
depictions would be analogous to these two hypotheticals if they were regulated because
they appear on canvas, or because they are displayed in a certain place at a certain time.
That is not the case, however, because § 474 and § 504 regulate the image, not the mode
of expression.
The potential of the government preventing ideas from being heard is exactly what
motivates the hostility to content-based restrictions. The asserted interest in preventing
counterfeiting does not automatically overcome the fact that these statutes do so in a way
that discriminates against speech based on content. By censoring expression containing
depictions of currency, the government favors one view over another and violates one of
the central tenets of the First Amendment, that "government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."" 0
Once deemed content-based, a regulation has little chance of constitutional survival.
As discussed previously, regulations subjecting speech to a content-based restriction must
fall into an unprotected category to be upheld.' Communicative depictions of currency
do not belong to any category of unprotected speech. One such unprotected category is
incitement. Even if realistic currency depictions inspired would-be criminals to take up
counterfeiting, that likely would not qualify as unprotected incitement."
2
Two other unprotected categories of speech-obscenity and defamation with actual
malice-seem to have little to do with depictions of currency. It is, perhaps, conceivable
that an obscene or defamatory expression might also contain a realistic depiction of
currency. In such a case, however, the aspect of the-expression regulated is the obscene
or defamatory message, not the fact that it depicts currency.
It is also very difficult to conceive how fighting words-the final unprotected
category-could possibly involve realistic depictions of currency. The fighting words
doctrine, to the extent it is still viable at all, focuses on face-to-face verbal expression." 3
Depictions of currency are very unlikely to take such a form.
150. Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (citations omitted).
151. See supra part Il.C.
152. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Brandenburg requires much more direct incitement than
depictions of currency could realistically provide. Even if a picture of currency also featured the caption "Go Counterfeit
Now!" it would fall short of the direct incitement requirements of Brandenburg.
153. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Although Chaplinsky has never been explicitly
overruled, the Supreme Court has not sustained a conviction under the fighting words doctrine since Chaplinsky. GERALD
GUNnER, CONsiroNALLAW 1073 (12th ed. 1991). In a more modem case, the Supreme Court struck down a breach
of the peace conviction because the law, which provided that it was unlawful "without provocation, [to] use to or of
another... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace," contained language broader
than the narrow fighting words exception. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 (1972). The statute at issue in Gooding,
however, very closely resembles that at issue in Chaplinsry ("No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying
word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name
...."), which strongly suggests that Chaplinsky essentially has been overruled.
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Accepting § 474 and § 504 as content-based regulations of speech necessitates their
invalidation under the First Amendment. Both § 474 and § 504 only regulate depictions
because they contain a realistic image of currency. The statutes aim at the communicative
impact of the realistic depictions of currency. Sections 474 and 504 fit into no recognized
unprotected category of speech and should be held unconstitutional.
154
IV. THE AD Hoc BALANCING TEST AND § 474 AND § 504
Courts have consistently held both § 474 and § 504 to be content-neutral. 55 Even under
the more lenient First Amendment scrutiny applied to content-neutral regulations of
speech," 6 § 474 and § 504 fail because the government's true interest is insubstantial and
the means chosen to serve that interest are not effective. In addition, carefully examining
the government's interest and the means chosen to serve it strengthens the argument that
the statutes are content-based rather than content-neutral.
A. The Government's Interest
There is more than one way to define the government's interest in these statutes. How
specifically the interest is defined affects how narrowly tailored or effective various
regulations appear to be in serving that interest. On the most specific level, Congress'
interest in passing these statutes was "to tolerate no manipulation in the making of
impressions of government obligations or securities, whether the copies or impressions
might be good or bad, and regardless of the purpose for which they might be made."' 7
Defined as an interest in allowing no impressions of the currency for any reason, the
statutes serve that interest well. Accepting this version of the government's interest, a
complete prohibition of pictures of currency would serve the interest even better.
More troublesome is what underlies the government's interest and whether the interest
is substantial, or even legitimate. The government's interest is essentially a concern about
anything that looks too much like money, regardless of the intent of its creator or its
potential for fraudulent use. Describing the government's interest this way focuses less
on maintaining the integrity of currency as buying power or as a store of value, and more
on maintaining control over the currency's image. Whether the government has a
substantial interest in monopolizing the image of currency is much more questionable
than its constitutionally mandated duty to punish counterfeiting. Also, inquiring into the
government's interest at all inescapably leads to the conclusion that § 474 and § 504 are
154. Any argument that a new category should be created in order to uphold this content-based regulation should be
quickly rejected by any reviewing court. The Supreme Court has declined to acknowledge new unprotected categories even
for expression that can be quite offensive and hurtful. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). An unprotected category entirely for depictions of currency would seriously dilute
content-based analysis.
155. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984); Boggs v. Bowron, 842 F. Supp. 542 (DD.C. 1993); Wagner v. Simon,
412 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aft'd, 534 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1976).
156. See supra part ll.B.
157. Webb v. United States, 216 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1954).
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indeed content-based. The government's interest, defined broadly or narrowly, focuses
entirely on content, on the fact that there is a picture of money.
An interest in preventing and punishing counterfeiting differs from an interest in
banning everything that looks too much like money. As J.S.G. Boggs fruitlessly riddled
Scotland Yard upon his arrest for counterfeiting in England: "What if I gave you a
painting of a horse? Would you put a saddle on it?"" *A picture is something other than
the thing which it depicts, a point which Belgian painter Rene Magritte elegantly makes
in his famous painting The Treachery of Images. The painting shows a picture of a pipe
and bears the words "This is not a pipe."'5 9 Of course it is not a pipe, it is a picture of a
pipe. This important distinction is disregarded when the government's interest in
preventing counterfeiting is construed as an interest in forbidding all accurate depictions
of currency regardless of intent. An accurate depiction of money is not money, and
without the intent to pass it as genuine it is not counterfeit money either. Thus,
prohibiting all items looking too much like money does not narrowly serve an interest in
eradicating counterfeit money. Sections 474 and 504 do a good job of eradicating
anything that looks too much like money, but it is not clear why that interest is
substantial. 6 It is a mistake to conflate the interest in preventing and punishing
counterfeiting with the interest in banning accurate depictions of money. Separate
justification apart from the prevention of counterfeiting should be required of the latter
interest. It is not the same as nor necessary to the prevention and' punishment of
counterfeiting.
The government's concern with maintaining control over the currency's likeness does
not necessarily bespeak an illiberal desire for government control of what people paint,
draw, or photograph. As discussed in the next section, any system of money, at least
paper money, depends on the ability of people to trust the government issuing the
currency.16 ' Disastrous consequences would follow if fake currency became so common
that people could no longer trust currency as a means of exchange. Since the government
undeniably has a compelling interest in averting the collapse of the monetary system, the
government's concern about artistic expression involving currency is to some extent
justified.
The way to maintain trust in the currency, however, is to prevent and punish actual
counterfeiterg and to implement monetary policies which ensure a sound currency, not
merely to maintain control over money's likeness. The United States Treasury
Department recently unveiled new, redesigned $100 bills which will go into circulation
158. Boggs, supra note 3, at 99.
159. SARAH WHrfnELD, MAGRnTr cat. 67 (1992). It is perhaps telling, however, that Magritte felt reluctant to
display this painting out of fear that "it might be used as a pretext to lock me up in a madhouse." Id As the Author
choosing to use this example, perhaps I run the same risk.
160. The government could justifiably be concerned about the misuse of these depictions by people other than the
creator. However, people attempting to use the depictions fraudulently would be subject to punishment under § 473, which
punishes using counterfeit currency with intent to defraud, regardless of who actually created the item. Furthermore few
communicative depictions of currency would actually be mistaken for authentic money. See supra notes 172-76 and
accompanying text. Consequently, the would-be counterfeiter may not be very successful in passing off the depictions as
real.
161. S. HERBERT FRANKmL, MONEY: TWO PHILOSOPHI.S 38 (1977).
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in early 1996.162 The new bills have been redesigned to thwart reproduction with
computer scanners and color photocopiers. The new security features include an
embedded thread, a watermark portrait of Ben Franklin, green ink that appears gold when
held at a n angle, and a pattern on the bill which will stand out only when it has been
photocopied." Counterfeiting abroad, not counterfeiting in the United States, prompted
the redesign: almost three times as many counterfeit bills were seized abroad as were
seized domestically in 1993.161 Counterfeit $100 bills have almost become the rule in
foreign countries rather than the exception. 65 The redesigned bill represents the sort of
policies and strategies that directly attack the counterfeiting problem. These reforms
serve the government's interest far more effectively and narrowly than § 474 and § 504.
Restricting the speech of those seeking to express ideas about money is not a
constitutionally permissible way of maintaining trust in the nation's currency.
An alternative way of framing the government's interest in § 474 and § 504 is a more
general concern with punishing and preventing counterfeiting. Article I of the
Constitution specifically grants that power 66 and given the undisputed importance of a
sound and uncontaminated currency, this interest is certainly compelling.
At the time these statutes originated in the late 19th century and the early part of this
century, the interest in punishing counterfeiting was even more pressing than it is now.
In 1864, when the Secret Service came into existence, nearly fifty percent of all currency
in circulation was counterfeit. 67 Compared to a crisis of that magnitude, modem levels
of counterfeiting seem quite small. But counterfeiting remains a significant problem, with
U.S. currency being the most frequently counterfeited in the world. 6 In 1993, $44
million was seized domestically in counterfeit bills. 6 9 No matter what the precise
numbers, the government's interest in preventing and punishing counterfeiting is
compelling.
By defining the government interest as prohibiting anything looking too much like
money, restrictions on color and size fit perfectly. More difficult questions of fit arise
when the government's interest is framed more broadly, for instance, as the punishment
and prevention of counterfeiting. Once one sees the forest rather than just a tree,
regulations which once fit perfectly may no longer look as effective or as narrow as they
once did.
Sections 474 and 504 do not serve the government's interest narrowly and effectively
when the interest is defined broadly as the punishment and prevention of counterfeiting.
Other sections of Title 18 punish those actually counterfeiting money or intending to use
162. Will Ben's New Look Stop Counterfeits?,N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at C5.
163. Robert A. Rosenblatt, New Currency Aims to Counter Counterfeiters, L.A. TIMS, July 14,1994, at Al.
164. Judith A. Gunther, MakingMoney, POPULAR SC., Nov. 1994, at 70, 71.
165. There are numerous stories illustrating the prevalence of counterfeit dollars in some parts of the world. In 1993,
kidnappers in Russia reportedly held students and teachers ransom for $10 million in U.S. $100 bills. The money was
delivered to the kidnappers, but they would not release the hostages until they were provided with a machine to sort real
$100 bills from counterfeits. Monika Guttman, High-Tech Counterfeiting, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 5, 1994, at
72, 73. In the Middle East, counterfeit $100 bills are so prevalent that many merchants there demand $120 for $100 of
merchandise to offset potential losses from counterfeiting. Rosenblatt, supra note 163, at Al.
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
167. GLASER, supra note 24, at 107, 113.
168. Boggs v. Bowron, 842 F. Supp. 542, 556 n.32 (D.D.C. 1993).
169. Gunther, supra note 164, at 70.
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counterfeit money as genuine. Those who make impressions of money with the intent to
defraud, even if they never actually use them, violate § 471. 1 Those who actually use
counterfeit money with the intent that it be accepted as true and genuine violate § 473171
Thus, the only activity uniquely prohibited by § 474 and § 504 is making realistic
depictions of money with no intent to defraud or use as genuine. Without any intent
requirement, these statutes do not further the goal of preventing and punishing
counterfeiting. While the governmeht should have many weapons against counterfeiting,
it is not clear why it needs a weapon which does not hit the target; that is, why it needs
§ 474 when § 471 and § 473 already clearly encompass those intending to counterfeit.
Furthermore, much of the expressive activity falling within § 474 and § 504's scope
would not present a great danger of being used fraudulently anyway. By being
communicative, the depiction gives itself away as not being "real money." Counterfeiters
only succeed in their fraudulent endeavors when others accept their work as
unquestionably genuine. A one-sided bill with a green thumbprint on the back or an
oversized $30 bill with Nixon's picture on it are not good candidates for acceptance as
actual currency, and even less so is a painting of money on canvas or a photograph of
money on a magazine cover. Of course, there are always those who would fall for the
"proverbial wooden nickel,"'" but most areas of the law recognize that individuals have
some responsibility to look out for themselves. J.S.G. Boggs himself has rather
uncharitably summed it up as follows: "[L]aw is supposed to be based on the standard of
a reasonable person, not a moron in a hurry."" Most artistic or political depictions of
currency would give themselves away as art work or as political statements and thus fail
as successful counterfeits.' 74
Conversely, if the depiction lacks communicative characteristics, it is unlikely to be
perceived as communicative. Under the test established in Spence v. Washington 75 in
order for activity to be protected by the First Amendment, the actor must intend to
communicate and a reasonable observer must perceive the actor to be communicating.
Something about the depiction must "give itself away" as not being just money or
counterfeit money. 76 Precisely this need to be understood as communicative makes the
depiction unlikely to be used fraudulently. If it were good enough to use fraudulently, it
170. 18 U.S.C. § 471 (prohibiting the making of counterfeits, whether or not they are actually passed as currency).
171. Id § 473 (prohibiting use of counterfeits, regardless of who produced them).
172. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,702 n.6 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
173. J.S.G. Boggs, Who Owns This?, 68 C.-KENL. REV. 889, 898 (1993).
174. Anecdotal historical evidence exists which indicates that the Secret Service has never been too selective about
to whom it directs its attention. It is reported that in 1891 the Secret Service ordered a Philadelphia baker to desist from
making cookies which looked like the Indian head cent. In 1924, the Secret Service seized a six-foot-long rug from a
department store in Akron, Ohio because its design was that on the $1 bill. GLASER, supra note 24, at 112. Attempting
to pass off a magazine cover as real currency looks like a sophisticated heist compared to the ludicrous image of
defrauding someone with a cookie or a rug.
175. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
176. Particularly with communicative activity that has a more common noncommunicative purpose, the context of
the communication is crucial to its being perceived as communicative. These "contextual indicia' of communicative
activity include time and locale of the conduct, current events, media attention, verbal or written explanation, and use of
recognized symbols. Many examples of currency being used communicatively satisfied these contextual indicia, making
the communicative nature clearer. Boggs offers a verbal explanation of his work; Sports Illustrated chose its magazine
cover as the locale for its communicative conduct. Both ofthose indicia should tip offthe reasonable observer that the
speaker did not intend the depiction to be accepted as real. Magid, supra note 92, at 488-91.
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would be hard for a reasonable observer to perceive it as communicative. Since the
expression which § 474 and § 504 target is not likely to be used fraudulently, the statutes
are not narrowly tailored relative to the goal of preventing and punishing counterfeiting.
In sum, when the interest is framed as preventing and punishing counterfeiting, it is not
only substantial, but also compelling. The problem with § 474 and § 504 is at the means
level because regulating depictions of money created by those with no intent to use the
depictions fraudulently and, indeed, with only a small possibility of fraudulent use at all,
does not meaningfully advance the interest in preventing counterfeiting.
B. The First Amendment Interest
The countervailing side of the balancing test requires an assessment of the First
Amendment interests at stake. The First Amendment interests can be divided for
analytical purposes into two parts: first, the artistic and symbolic power of money; and
second, the sociopolitical meaning of money.
To illustrate the First Amendment value of images of currency in drtistic endeavors,
this Note briefly reviews a specific movement in art history in which currency figured
prominently. Representations of currency have a long history in American art; they are
"peculiarly American, as is their irreverent and at times provocative tone." 77 The most
prominent and cohesive set of money painters in American history worked during the last
half of the 19th century, beginning with painter William Michael Harnett. These painters
employed a particular style of still life called trompe l'oeil. 71 Money represented a
natural subject for these painters since they painted during the period immediately
following the Civil War, known as the "Greenback Era," when currency was one of the
most hotly-debated political issues of the day.17 Not only did money occupy the political
agenda, but the social milieu of the time elevated money and the pursuit of it to a very
high level, leading this to be called the "Gilded Age."' 5
Harnett's work prompted a series of trompe l'oeil money painters to come after him.
Harnett did not paint very many money paintings himself, however, because he was
temporarily detained by the Secret Service and ordered not to paint any more pictures of
money. 8' John Haberle picked up Harnett's legacy of money painting, but did so with a
much sharper political and social bite. Haberle was also renown for his exceedingly high
level of skill at trompe l'oeil, often fooling even the most discerning of art
177. Edward J. Nygren, The Almighty Dollar: Money as a Theme in American Painting, 23 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLuO
129, 129 (1988).
178. Trompe I'oeil is a French term meaning "deception of the eye." Trompe l'oeil painting is characterized by a very
high level of realism that fools the viewer into believing the objects in the painting are real rather than painted. ATKINS,
supra note 2, at 140.
179. Nygren, supra note 177, at 129.
180. Id. at 130. The term "Gilded Age" is actually the title of a book by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner in
which the main character, Beriah Sellers, is a tireless promoter and advocate of so-called "easy money," money not backed
by gold or silver, to finance his developments in the American West. UNGER, supra note 27, at 45. Other literature of the
era reflected much the same concern with money and social status as is found in the paintings of the trompe l'oeil money
painters, such as William Dean Howells' The Rise of Silas Lapham and Theodore Dreiser's Sister Carrie. Nygren, supra
note 177, at 130, 136.
181. CHAMBERS, supranote 15, at 23.
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connoisseurs."' Such skill not only caught the attention of the art world, but of the Secret
Service as well. The Secret Service did not arrest Haberle, but visited his studio and told
him to stop painting depictions of money. Unlike his more obedient elder, Haberle
continued painting money even after the Secret Service's warning.' In fact, Haberle's
work after the Secret Service's visit veritably flaunted the potential counterfeiting
problems supposedly presented by his paintings. In his paintings Can You Break a Five?
and US.A., Haberle painted pictures of currency featuring the actual warning against
counterfeiting, which was at that time printed on the bills depicted in the painting.M
Roughly the same time as Haberle was painting, Alfred Meurer was also painting
trompe l'oeil images of currency, but to less critical acclaim and notoriety. Like Harnett
and Haberle, Meurer attracted the attention of the Secret Service. The Secret Service
ultimately confiscated his painting entitled My Passport which featured pictures of $5
and $20 bills." 5 Meurer was undaunted by this confiscation and continued painting
money.
186
At the end of the 19th century, New York City painter Victor Debreuil continued in the
money painting footsteps. Debreuil's work was heavily critical of money's role in the
society of his time, particularly the great accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few,
such as railroad magnates."" Though the Secret Service never arrested Debreuil, they
confiscated several of his paintings, and destroyed at least one of them."'
This brief sketch of America's 19th-century trompe l'oeil money painters demonstrates
that the image of currency can and does serve a crucial role in artistic expression.
Realistic depictions of currency provided the foundation for an entire era of American
painting. During their time, these artists provided graphic commentary on the role of
money in the world around them."9 Today, they provide an extra dimension to the
historical understanding of that era. The latter part of the 19th century saw never-before-
experienced accumulations of wealth and an obsession with money, particularly paper
money. "Nothing in American painting more literally embodies that preoccupation than
paintings of currency. Although there are earlier currency pieces in European art, there
182. Stories of Haberle's outstanding skill at "fooling the eye" abound in the art history of this era. Haberle's 1890
painting entitled Grandma's Hearthstone featured a trompe loeil rendition of a fireplace which was so realistic that the
owner of the painting's cat would curl up next to it to sleep. Id at 36. While a cat may be easy to fool, Haberle's painting,
USA., depicting a well-worn one dollar bill, even fooled the art critic of Chicago's Inter-Ocean newspaper. USA. was
in Chicago for an exhibit and the art critic denounced it as a fraud claiming it was only fragments of a bill pasted onto the
canvas. Haberle immediately traveled to Chicago to defend his honor, and demonstrated that the work was indeed painted.
AUFRED FRANKENSTEIN, AFR IE HUN 117 (1969).
183. CHAMERS, supra note 15, at 25.
184. Id at 31-32. The bills contained this printed warning:
Counterfeiting, or altering this note, or passing any counterfeit or alteration of it, or having in possession
any false or counterfeit plate or impression of it, or any paper made in imitation of the paper on which
it is printed, is punishable by $5000 fine or 15 years at hard labor or. both.
Id.
185. Id at 47. The painting was ultimately released for exhibition on the condition that Meurer paint red lines through
the pictures of currency. Id, The similarity between this condition imposed by the Secret Service in the 19th century and
the new regulations issued by the Secret Service, requiring the words "non-negotiable" on all images of currency, is
strildng. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
186. CHAMERS, supra note 15, at 47.
187. Nygren, supra note 177, at 143.
188. CHAMBERs, supra note 15, at 68; Boggs, supra note 3, at 127.
189. Nygren, supra note 177, at 130.
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is no precedent for the flood of such works in American art of this period."' 90 Not only
do these paintings provide historical insight, but they also define a distinctly American
aspect of art history, an artistic movement with themes still very relevant today:
inhere is more to trompe l'oeil money painting than meets the eye. It is not only an art
of mischievous replication; it is also an art of real content. It possesses an iconography,
a structured symbolic language, that draws from, and addresses, the events and beliefs
of a historically verifiable culture. That this slice of cultural history happens to be one
of our own does not make this. any less legitimate an observation. A democratic,
middle-class, American iconography is still an iconography, and money painting plays
an important role in its development. 9'
American artists' interest in painting currency did not end at the close of the last
century. As already discussed, J.S.G. Boggs has almost exclusively dedicated himself to
money painting. Depicting currency also caught the attention of modern art icon Andy
Warhol. The majority of Warhol's work with the image of money were photo silkscreens
rather than paintings. He silkscreened the image of both sides of the $1 bill, and then
reproduced it numerous times on large pieces of cloth. Later, he moved on to depictions
of money in pencil and watercolor.' 92 Warhol's depictions of currency, although not
intended to achieve the trompe l'oeil level of realism, were still in color, close to actual
size, and quite realistic. There is no record of the Secret Service ever having investigated
Warhol's depictions of currency.
Money represents a socially and politically powerful symbol. Even Justice Stevens,
who advocated upholding the entirety of § 474 and § 504 in Regan v. Time, Inc.,
recognized the power of currency as a symbol: "The .familiar image of United States
currency became a powerful symbol to the point of perhaps becoming somewhat of a
modern icon."'93 If money were not a powerful symbol, trompe l'oeil money painters
would not have depicted it, Sports Illustrated would have chosen another cover
photograph for its February 16, 1981, issue, and Boggs would draw something else. The
image of money is a powerful symbol because the reality and substance of money is a
powerful force. An extensive discussion of the sociological implications of money
exceeds the scope of this Note, 9 4 but a brief discussion of money's social and political
aspects will help establish why its image is a powerful symbol and why the ideas
expressed by that symbol have political and social value under the First Amendment.
Money in modem society is "a sociological phenomenon, a form of social interaction
among people." 95 As Boggs emphasizes in his work, the value of paper money depends
190. WuLmAM KLoss, MORE THAN MEETs THE EYE: THE ART OF TROMPE L'OEIL 29 (1985).
191. CHAMBERS, supra note 15, at 96.
192. ANDY WARHOL: A RErRosI'EcrvE 160-67 (Kynastin MoShine ed., 1989).
193. 468 U.S. 641 at 695 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Stevens' assessment of the symbolic power of
money is nearly the same as that of J.S.G. Boggs, although the similarities in their points of view on the subject probably
end there. Boggs wrote: "Money is, of course, a powerfully charged symbol, as complex and diverse as any religious
icon." Boggs, supra note 3. at 99.
194. For extensive scholarly discussion of the sociology of money, see FRANKEL, supra note 161, and MONEY AND
THE MORALITY OF EXCHANGE (Maurice Bloch & Jonathan Parry eds., 1989).
195. FRANKEL, supra note 161, at 16.
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upon trust in one another and in the political institution issuing the currency. 96 Boggs
does not seek to undermine that trust or even to criticize it. Instead, Boggs tries to make
people recognize that the value of money is a matter of faith which ought to be
consciously accepted or rejected. 97
In addition to Boggs' rather esoteric discussions of trust and value in society, on a
more direct level, money simply plays a major role in most aspects of life. From the most
personal level to the national level, money changes people's lives. An extensive survey
of attitudes toward money conducted in 1986 found thirty-seven percent of respondents
reporting that they and their spouse had argued about money over the past twelve months,
making money the source of most marital controversy. 98 On a larger scale, money has
come to be an issue of increasing importance in national politics. The average cost of a
successful Senate electoral campaign has reached $4 million and the average cost of a
campaign for the House of Representatives is $600,000.1 With this much money
required to run for office, concerns naturally arise about the antidemocratic notion of
buying one's way into office.
Even this cursory glance at the major effect money has on individuals and societies
illustrates the broad range of possible statements to make with accurate depictions of
money. The plaintiff in Wagner v. Simon must have believed that the image of currency
provided a particularly effective vehicle for a protest of economic policy and
corruption. 0' A picture of currency also provided a succinct and memorable way to
express an idea about the corrupting influence of money in college basketball, as the
editors of Sports Illustrated magazine recognized. 20 1 Because money can mean so many
things, many of which lie close to the heart of democracy and the political process,
relegating depictions of money to black and white and distorted sizes takes away a
substantial part of a speaker's vocabulary. In sum, the interest at stake here is an artistic,
symbolic, and sociopolitical image with great power to communicate a variety of ideas.
Under any theory of the First Amendment, those interests merit strong First Amendment
protection. The numerous examples of money's communicative effect also emphasize that
196. Boggs v.'Bowron, 842 F. Supp. 542, 544-45 (DD.C. 1993); cf FRANKEL, supra note 161, at 16 ("That paper
money could become the instrument of the highest monetary function, and even be used as a store of value, was possible
only in social groups closely knit by mutual guarantees for protection .... ").
197. Boggs, 842 F. Supp. at 544-45. Boggs illustrates this point by showing how the physical trappings of money can
confuse the issue of its value. His drawings look almost exactly like money, but have no value (other than what art
collectors will pay for them). Thus, money must be valuable for some reason other than the fact that it looks like money.
It is this conclusion which Boggs hopes people will reach during their transaction with him. MONEY MAN, supra note 4.
The issue of trust and money will probably become even more relevant as society undergoes another shift in the way
moncy is used. Much like the paper money revolution during the Greenback Era, the decline of paper money may be the
revolution of this age. The move to a "cashless society" has picked up speed in the past several years, with a 200%
increase in the use of electronic transactions since 1986. Thomas McCarroll, No Checks. No Cash. No Fuss?, TIME, May
9, 1994, at 60. Goods and services ranging from fast food to utility service have converted to cashless electronic debit
systems, and many financial analysts predict the advent of an all-in-one "smart carl" with a computer chip containing an
individual's financial data. In addition to raising complex privacy issues, the ascent of digital methods of payment and
exchange will require an assessment of the issues of trust and value and how they apply to digital money. Id; see also
Albert B. Crenshaw, Seeking the Card That Would Create a Cashless World, WASH. PosT, Apr. 3, 1994, at HI.
198. LEwis YABLONSKY, THEEMOTIONALMEANINGOF MONEY 4 (1991).
199. Michael Ross, Campaign FinanceReform May Be Clinton's Hardest Sell, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1993, at A23.
200.412 F. Supp. 426,428 (V.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1976).
201. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,646 (1984). -
1995]
INDIA NA LAW JOURAL
§ 474 and § 504 are content-based, since it is precisely the depiction's communicative
effect which they target.
Courts must also discern the degree of First Amendment abridgment caused by the
challenged regulations. The regulation at issue here is § 504's color and size restrictions.
Concededly, § 504 does not abridge expression as radically as possible since § 474's
broad ban of all depictions of currency regardless of intent might have been left
unmodified by § 504. However, the color and size restrictions still present a substantial
abridgment.
Particularly with artistic expression, color and size matter a great deal since they are
important avenues for artistic expression. Thus, depriving an artist of the ability to depict
currency in color (its actual color or any other) and restricting its size seriously impedes
artistic expression. With these color and size restrictions in effect and applied to artistic
expression, the trompe l'oeil movement in painting as it applied to currency never could
have happened. The objective was to create "the closest possible facsimiles of objects in
order to play the visual games of illusion successfully."2 2 Thus, on purely artistic
grounds, the color and size restrictions would have almost completely abridged the
trompe l'oeil money painting movement.
As for the social or political content of the paintings of the Greenback Era, the
depictions would not have had the same impact nor made the same statement had they not
looked like real money. The often critical and ironic views of money presented in these
paintings relied on the artists' ability to arrange visual puns around realistic images of
currency.3 Without the depiction of realistic-looking currency, the statement would have
been lost, or at least its force greatly diminished.
In terms of sociopolitical expression involving money, the color and size requirements
also seriously restrict expression. Without an accurate depiction, the message may appear
less serious or credible. Particularly in the case of J.S.G. Boggs, forbidding depictions
in color or of the correct size would make the message of his work impossible. Boggs
wants his audience to think about why they accept money, and to think about what it
means for money to be genuine. If Boggs' bills looked completely different than actual
currency, this would provide a superficial reason for the listener to reject the bill without
having to think about Boggs' message. Boggs acutely understands'the impact of the color
and size restrictions on his work: "They want to turn my work into some kind ofjoke. By
making my work larger or smaller or in some other color, they limit my vocabulary to the
drab or to the comic."2" Boggs' First Amendment interest is almost entirely abridged by
the color and size restrictions of § 504.
Of course, one instance of a severe abridgment does not alone indicate that most
expression will be abridged. However, it is plausible that expression involving depictions
of currency would appear cartoonish and less likely to be taken seriously if depicted in
only black and white and not close to actual size. The cover of Sports Illustrated would
202. CHAMBERS, supra note 15, at 15.
203. See generally id (presenting many trompe I'oeil paintings and discussing how the various artists juxtapose other
items against the currency such as newspaper clippings, postage stamps, playing cards, or weapons); Nygren, supra note
177, at 136-40 (describing Haberle's compositions).
204. Roberts, supra note 6, at B1.
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certainly lose its visual impact if the bills flying through the basketball hoop were in
black and white. Because the bills in the picture are real, in full color, and so numerous,
the cover is shocking-which is the very effect desired by the magazine.
With examples such as Boggs and Sports Illustrated, it is plausible to believe that some
artists or other commentators may have considered expressing an idea using the image
of currency, but declined due to fear of violating these laws. This "chilling effect" is also
an abridgment of speech, since the expressive depictions never come into existence at all.
Expression using currency is abridged by being relegated to unrealistic depictions, or by
being prevented from occurring at all.
Traditionally, the ad hoe balancing test makes some inquiry into whether alternative
methods of expression exist. "[T]he availability of alternative channels for the speaker
to reach the same audience with the same message ... is a necessary part of the
constitutional analysis when government abridges speech without regard to its expressive
content."2 5 One alternative to realistically depicting money is to instead use unrealistic
images of currency in black and white and within the size limits. The reasons why that
alternative constitutes a significant abridgment were discussed in the preceding section.
Another alternative which the proponents of these statutes might offer is that the same
message could be expressed verbally instead of visually. For example, Boggs could write
essays about his work (which indeed he has2" 6) rather than rely on his depictions of
currency to make his point. Likewise, Sports Illustrated cQuld have just featured an
article discussing the point shaving scheme at Boston College. The truism that "a picture
is worth a thousand words" has earned its proverbial status by being so accurate. An
image means something different than the words which describe it or define it. "A woman
with long black hair and a strange smile" certainly does not accurately convey everything
DaVinci's Mona Lisa expresses. Because there are so many aspects of the Mona Lisa
which defy words, the thought can only be conveyed through an image. Thus, the
suggestion that artists could verbally, rather than pictorially, express their thoughts
provides no alternative at all. The thoughts they would express verbally are inherently
different thoughts than they would express visually.
The proposed regulation requiring the words "non-negotiable" on depictions of
currency 2 7 suffers from the same constitutional infirmities as a complete ban on color
depictions. The "non-negotiable" requirement does not narrowly serve the government's
interest. The artistic and political expression which has fallen victim to § 474 and § 504
"gives itself away" as expressive activity anyway, even without the words
"non-negotiable." The cost of this proposed rule, in First Amendment terms, is great since
requiring the words "non-negotiable" on all depictions of currency would often defeat the
purpose of such depictions. The power of the trompe l'oeil money painters' and their
modem counterpart, J.S.G. Boggs', work stems from the fact that the currency looks real,
even if the context in which it is presented undercuts that realism. Not only artistic
depictions of currency rely on realism. The powerful effect of the Sports Illustrated cover
205. TREBE, supra note 71, § 12-23, at 982.
206. See, e.g., Boggs, supra note 173; Boggs, supra note 3.
207. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
1995]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
photo showing $100 bills stuffed in a basketball hoop would have been diminished by the
words "non-negotiable" on each of the bills.
In sum, the color and size requirements work a substantial abridgment of the First
Amendment interests. They take away two particularly important modes of artistic
expression-color and size. Further, they impede the artist's ability to communicate
effectively with images of currency by relegating such depictions to nonrealistic ones.
CONCLUSION
Sections 474 and 504 regulate expression based on content and fit into none of the
unprotected categories of speech. As such, the statutes should be declared
unconstitutional. Even if subjected to the ad hoc balancing test reserved for
content-neutral regulations of speech, § 474 and § 504 must fail. These sections
ineffectively serve the government's interest and seriously impede protected expression.
One option for curing the First Amendment problems would be simply to repeal § 474
and § 504 altogether. Doing so would not deprive the government of opportunities to
prosecute those intending to do wrong since those people making money with intent to
defraud fall within other sections of Title 18. If § 474 and § 504 remain in their current
form, explicit exceptions ought to be made for those engaging in political and artistic
expression without any intent to defraud. Under either of these options, the government's
interest in punishing and preventing counterfeiting continues to be served by § 471 and
§ 473, but the First Amendment interest in depictions of money are also protected.
The government has an undeniably strong interest in maintaining the reliability and
stability of its currency, but censoring expression that does not intend to counterfeit or
defraud is not constitutionally sound. Furthermore, § 474 and § 504, as applied to artistic
and political expression, do not effectively serve that interest. If § 474 and § 504 no
longer applied to artistic and political expression, the government would not lose
anything valuable in its fight against counterfeiting. What would be gained, however, is
the continuation of the American tradition of using images of money to make statements
about society, about art, about politics, or about money itself. Money talks and everyone
should be able hear what it has to say.
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